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State sentencingguidelines:
stillgoing strong
State sentencingguidelines are more successful than theirfederal counterpart
because they reflect a more balanced approach
to criticalissues of sentencingpolicy.

by Richard S. Frase

S

are thriving-in the states.
While the federal guidelines
entencinghighly
guidelines
reforms
remain
unpopular
among judges, defense attorneys, and
scholars, state guidelines have
achieved broader support, and their
number has grown steadily.
As of November 1994, 17 states had
placed guidelines into effect, and five
more had appointed commissions to
Earlier versions of this article appeared in 6 FED.
SENTENCING REP., no. 3 (1993) and in 5 OVERCROWDED TIMES, no. 2 (1994).

implement or study this approach. For
sentencing reformers in other states,
and at the federal level, there is much
to be learned from the experiences of
the guidelines states. These experiences show that sentencing guidelines
can succeed in bringing greater fairness and rationality to sentencing.
Although state guidelines are diverse in their specific provisions, they
have many common features. Some of
these features are lacking in the federal guidelines, and these differences
may explain the greater success of
January-February1995

guidelines in the states. State guidelines generally retain more judicial discretion than the federal version, and
they permit consideration of a wider
RICHARD S. FRASE is the Benjamin N.
Berger Professor of Criminal Law at the
University of Minnesota.

range of sentencing purposes and offender characteristics.
Most state sentencing guidelines
also give greater emphasis to the goal
Volume 78, Number 4 Judicature 173

Table 1 State sentencing guidelines systems
Jurisdiction

Effective date

Scope and distinctive features

Utah

1979

Alaska
Minnesota
Pennsylvania

1-1-80
5-1-80
7-22-82

Florida
Maryland
Michigan
Washington

10-1-83
1983
1-17-84
7-1-84

Wisconsin
Delaware

11-1-85
10-10-87

Oregon

11-1-89

Tennessee
Virginia

11-1-89
1-1-91

Louisiana
Kansas
Arkansas
North Carolina
Massachusetts,
Missouri, Ohio,
Oklahoma,
South Carolina

1-1-92
7-1-93
1-1-94
10-1-94
(in process)

Voluntary; retains parole board; no permanent commission until 1983; linked to correctional
resources since 1993
No permanent sentencing commission; statutory guidelines' scope expanded by caselaw
Designed not to exceed 95 percent of prison capacity; extensive database and research
Also covers misdemeanors; broad ranges and departure standards; retains parole board;
encourages non-prison sanctions since 1994
Formerly voluntary
Voluntary; retains parole board
Voluntary; retains parole board
Includes upper limits on non-prison sanctions, some defined exchange rates, and vague,
voluntary charging standards; resource-impact assessment required
Voluntary; descriptive (modelled on existing practices); retains parole board
Voluntary; narrative (not grid) format; also covers misdemeanors and some non-prison sanctions;
linked to resources; parole board retained until July 1990.
Grid includes upper limits on custodial non-prison sanctions, with some defined exchange rates;
linked to resources; many new mandatory minimums added in 1994
Also covers misdemeanors; retains parole board; sentences linked to resources
Voluntary; judicially controlled, and parole board retained, until 1995; resource-impact
assessments required since 1995
Includes intermediate sanction guidelines and exchange rates; linked to resources
Sentences linked to resources
Voluntary; detailed enabling statute; resource-impact assessment required
Also covers most misdemeanors; sentences linked to resources
All enabling statutes encourage resource-matching; Ohio commission rejected grid format;
Massachusetts and Missouri statutes retain parole board

of predicting and avoiding prison
overcrowding. To ensure sufficient
prison space for violent offenders, as
well as adequate punishment of less serious crimes, guidelines states have increasingly encouraged judges to employ "intermediate sanctions," or
non-custodial penalties more intensive
than simple probation. In contrast, the
federal guidelines have done very little
to promote the use of non-custodial
penalties. In general, state guidelines
reflect a more balanced approach to
critical issues of sentencing policy.

authority to study sentencing practices
and recommend guidelines. Almost all
of the guidelines states have established a permanent sentencing commission or similar body. These commissions have usually been created by
statute, but some were initially formed
by the judiciary and only later received
legislative support. Most state sentencing commissions include judges, prosecuting and defense lawyers, corrections officials, public members, and
sometimes legislators, making these
panels much more broadly representative than the federal commission.

Sentencing commissions differ
greatly in their roles relative to the legislature.' In Minnesota, for instance,
the legislature gave the commission
very little specific direction either in
the enabling statute or in the early
years of implementation. Although
the legislature later took back some of
the authority it had delegated, the
commission still retains primary control over the formulation of statewide
sentencing policy. In contrast, other
state legislatures have played a much
more active role by carefully structuring the commission's mandate, as in

1. It should be noted that guidelines sometimes
fail to obtain adoption. In Connecticut, Maine,
and Texas, sentencing commissions recommended
against adoption of guidelines. Sentencing commissions in Colorado, New York, South Carolina,
and Washington, D.C., were unable to persuade
the legislature to adopt them (although renewed
efforts are underway in South Carolina). Guidelines were initially rejected by the Pennsylvania and
Kansas legislatures, but each state later enacted a
revised version. Finally, although no guidelines system has yet been repealed, a few have suffered major setbacks: in November 1994, Oregon voters approved Ballot Measure 11, overriding the guide-

lines and imposing mandatory minimum prison
terms on certain violent offenders (constituting
about 10 percent of all felony sentences).
2. The principal sources for this summary are: 6
FED. SENTENCING REP., no. 3 (1993) (essays on recent
sentencing reform efforts in nine states); Tonry,
Sentencing Commissions and Their Guidelines, 17
CRIME AND JUST. 137-195 (1993); and various statespecific reports and evaluations, too numerous to
cite, collected by the author and his colleague
Michael Tonry.
3. See generally, Symposium: A Decade of Sentencing
Guidelines: Revisiting the Role of the Legislature, 28
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 181461 (1993).

Overview of state guidelines
The 22 states with existing or proposed
sentencing guidelines are listed in
Table 1, in the order of their implementation. 1 The most important
similarities and differences are dis2

cussed below.

Makeup and role of sentencing commissions. A distinctive feature of sentencing guidelines reforms is the use
of an independent commission with
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Arkansas, or by strictly controlling
guidelines revisions, as in Washington.
Binding force of the guidelines.
Most state guidelines recommend presumptively correct sentences judges
are bound to follow unless they provide legally permissible reasons for departure, but several states have voluntary guidelines from which judges may
depart for any reason (provided, in
some states, that their reasons are
stated on the record).
Even within the group
of states with presumptively binding guidelines,
standards for departure
and appellate review vary
widely. In Pennsylvania,
to S
for example, departures
prime
are rarely reversed except
on procedural grounds
(failure to state reasons),
whereas reversal on substantive grounds (improper sentence) often
occurs in Alaska, Washington, and Minnesota,
each of which has a large
body of substantive appellate caselaw.
Nevertheless, trial courts in these
states still retain substantial areas of
discretion regarding both the type and
severity of sanctions. In this respect,
the federal guidelines appear to be
uniquely and unnecessarily rigid.
Scope of guidelines coverage. Most
state guidelines govern felony crimes
only, but a few also cover misdemeanors. All state guidelines regulate decisions about prison commitment and
prison duration, and some also limit
the use of consecutive sentences.
Many of the guidelines states have
not abolished parole release. In these
states, the guidelines usually determine either the minimum or the
maximum prison term to be served,
but not both. Guidelines states also
differ in the extent to which statutorily based mandatory-minimum
prison terms determine, or override,

guidelines rules. Such statutes appear to play a much smaller role in
the guidelines states than they do in
the federal system. Much of the excessive rigidity of the federal guidelines is due to the number and severity of these "mandatories."
As for non-prison sentences, many
guidelines states give greater emphasis
than the federal guidelines to probation and other intermediate sanctions
such as home detention, day-reporting

have assumed equal or greater importance in recent years. For instance, several states that have abolished parole
release and substituted limited "good
time" credits were responding to the
desire for "truth in sentencing,"
meaning that the length of prison
terms imposed by courts should
closely correspond to the amount of
time inmates actually serve.
A few states have largely "descriptive" guidelines designed to encourage judges to follow existing sentencing norms
more consistently. But even
these states usually seek to
make some "prescriptive"
changes in prior norms,
such as to eliminate exist-

Incireasingly, states are turniing
entencing guidelines with a

ry goal of using them to gain
Lletter control over rapidl)
esctalating prisonpopulatioiIS.

4. See Frase, The Uncertain Future of Sentencing
Guidelines, 12 LAW & INEQUALITY 19-23 (1993);
Tonry, supran. 2, at 181-183.
5. See Frase, Purposes of Punishment under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, 13 CRIM.JUsT. ETHICS 1120 (1994); Frase, Implementing Commission-Based
Sentencing Guidelines: The Lessons of the FirstTen Years
in Minnesota, 2 CORNELLJ. L. & PUB. POL. 279-337
(1993).

ing racial disparities. In

other states, the most common prescriptive changes
have involved increased
sentence severity for violent
and drug crimes.
Minnesota, Washington,
and Kansas explicitly based
their guidelines on a recenters, residential treatment, inten- tributive, or "just deserts," theory of
sive-supervision probation, commu- punishment, placing greater emphasis
nity service, and day fines. Although on the severity of the current offense
this difference may be partly due to and less on offender characteristics.
differences between state and federal However, even these states still leave
caseloads, it also reflects a generally substantial room for offender-based
less punitive approach by the states sentences and the pursuit of rehabiliand a greater emphasis on the goal of tative, incapacitative, special deterrent, and other non-retributive goals.
preventing prison overcrowding.
The states differ greatly in the de- This is particularly true in Minnesota.'
gree to which they regulate the con- In comparison to the federal guideditions of non-prison sentences and lines, state systems generally give more
decisions to revoke probation or post- consideration to offender charactprison release. Yet for a variety of rea- eristics and to rehabilitation, which is
sons, both practical and theoretical,4 achieved by community-based sancstate guidelines have generally done tions, not in prison.
Increasingly, states are turning to
little more than simply authorize and
encourage such penalties in lieu of sentencing guidelines with a primary
prison. A few states have presumptive goal of using them to gain better conlimits on the maximum aggregate se- trol over rapidly escalating prison
verity of all intermediate sanctions or populations and correctional exof certain components, such as jail. penses. Such control is made possible
Minimum non-prison severity require- by the greater uniformity and predictability of guidelines sentences, in comments are rarely imposed.
Sentencing reform goals and priori- parison with prior indeterminate senties. Sentencing guidelines were origi- tencing regimes. Minnesota pioneered
nally conceived as a means of making this approach in 1980. The enabling
sentencing more uniform and elimi- statute directed the commission to
nating unwarranted disparities. This is take correctional resources into "substill an important goal of state guide- stantial consideration." The Minnelines reforms, but several other goals sota commission took this directive
Januay-February1995
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very seriously and adopted a goal of
never exceeding 95 percent of available prison capacity. That goal was
achieved throughout the first decade
of guidelines sentencing. Minnesota
prison populations did increase, but
primarily in response to rising felony
caseloads and at rates far lower than in
other states.6 Prison construction was
able to accommodate inmate population growth without overcrowding or
multiple-bunking of high-security
inmates. Minnesota has thus avoided
the problems of court intervention
and reduced prison security plaguing
7
most states.

In contrast to Minnesota's approach, other early guidelines states
gave little or no priority to resourcematching. Starting in the mid-1980s,
however, as prison overcrowding problems grew around the country, many
other states adopted guidelines explicitly linked to available resources. In addition, most of the remaining guidelines states (and some non-guidelines
states)' have directed their commissions to file reports on the resource
impact of the guidelines or of proposed crime legislation.
The trend described above received
strong support in the recently revised
American Bar Association sentencing
standards.' Resource matching, which
was not mentioned in the 1979 version, is a central principle of the new
standards. Meanwhile, the U.S. Sentencing Commission continues to ignore its statutory mandate to consider
correctional resources and minimize
prison overcrowding. As of 1992, federal prisons were operating at 158 percent of capacity."l
Principal determinants of guidelines sentences. All guidelines states
base recommended sentences primarily on the most serious current conviction offense and the offender's prior
conviction record. There is some role
for details of unconvicted prior or current offenses, such as enhancements
for weapon use, regardless of whether
such use is an element of any current
conviction offense. But the guidelines
states are unanimous in rejecting the
broader "real offense" approach of
the federal guidelines, which permit
frequent and substantial sentence enhancements based on uncharged "rel-

Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Grid
Presumptive Sentence Lengths In Months
Criminal history score
Severity levels of
conviction offense
Sale of a Simulated

I

0

1

2

3

4

5

6 or
more

12"

12"

12"

13

15

17

19

Controlled Substance

18-20

Theft Related Crimes
($2500 or less)
Check Forgery
($200-$2500)

II

12

13

12"

15

17

19

21
20-22

Theft Crimes
($2500 or less)

III

12"

13

15

17

19
18-20

22
21-23

25
24-26

Nonresidential Burglary
Theft Crimes (over $2500)

IV

12"

15

18

21

25
24-26

32
30-34

41
37-45

Residential Burglary
Simple Robbery

V

18

23

27

30
29-31

38
36-40

46
43-49

54
50-58

Criminal Sexual Conduct
2nd Degree (a) & (b)

VI

21

26

30

34
33-35

44
42-46

54
50-58

65
60-70

Aggravated Robbery

VII

48
44-52

58
54-62

68
64-72

78
74-82

88
84-92

98
94-102

108
104-112

86
81-91

98
93-103

110
105-115

122
117-127

134
129-139

146
141-151

158
153-163

IX

150
144-156

165
159-171

180
174-186

195
189-201

210
204-216

225
219-231

240
234-246

X

306
299-313

326
319-333

346
339-353

366
359-373

386
379-393

406
399-413

426
419-433

Criminal Sexual Conduct,
1st Degree VIII
Assault, 1stDegree
Murder, 3rd Degree
Murder, 2nd Degree
(felony murder)
Murder, 2nd Degree
(with intent)

"One year and one day
Italicized numbers within the grid denote the range within which a judge may sentence without the sentence being deemed
a departure. Under state statutes, first degree murder has a mandatory life sentence.

evant conduct."
The federal approach was apparently designed to prevent prosecutors
from granting undue or inconsistent
leniency by means of selective charging and plea bargaining concessions."
Except for Washington, the guidelines
states place no limits on prosecutorial
discretion. Even Washington's limits
are vague and not judicially enforceable. Nevertheless, this apparent
loophole does not seem to have
caused any widespread dissatisfaction
with state guidelines.

Most states have promulgated guidelines in the form of a two-dimensional
grid, but a few employ narrative rules
for each offense or offense group.
State grids vary widely in their layouts
and "cell" ranges (wide or narrow,
overlapping or not). No state guidelines grid has as many offense levels,
and as complex a set of application
rules, as the federal guidelines.
State guidelines also reveal major
variations in severity ranking of offenses, formulas for computing prior
record, good-time credit amounts, and

6. See Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota and
Other American States: A Progress Report, in Morgan
and Clarkson, eds. THE POLITIcS OF SENTENCING REFORM (forthcoming, Oxford University Press), fig. 6
(increases in total prison-plus-jail populations mirrored increases in felony caseloads, throughout
the 1980s); id., fig. 7 (Minnesota inmate populations relative to adult arrests remained fairly constant from the mid-1970s through 1991; similar
measures for the nation as a whole began at about
the same level in 1975, but were 80 percent higher
by 1991).
7. See U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, PRISON

TEMS 4-5 (1989) (court orders or consent decrees
related to overcrowding had been issued in 35
states, as of April 1989).
8. See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. §196.081 (12-member
State Corrections Commission shall prepare sixyear projections of prison populations and help
legislative staff prepare corrections impact statements for proposed legislation).
9. See Reitz and Reitz, Building a sentencingreform
agenda: the ABA's new sentencingstandards,78JUDICATURE 189 (1995).
10. See Tonry, supra n. 2, at 176-177, 179.
11. Id. at 184.

CROWDING: ISSUES FACING

rttE NATION'S PRISON
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SYS-

ment of the initial guidelines, but also
as a means of monitoring their implementation and proposing revisions.
This empirical research component
has become increasingly important, as
states have begun to focus on the goal
by Ellen F.Rosenblum
of predicting and preventing future
prison overcrowding. Such predictions
require detailed information on curA recent informal survey of Multnomah County judges about
rent sentencing practices and the deOregon's felony sentencing guidelines, which went into effect Novelopment of sophisticated, computerized models combining data on
vember 1, 1989, produced a wide range of opinions regarding their
expected caseloads, presumptive senhave
they
usefulness and impact. However, all generally agreed that
tences, departure rates, and other facprovided for "truth-in-sentencing," which our judicial system previtors affecting the size and growth of
ously lacked.
prison populations.
Before guidelines, a five-year prison sentence frequently meant
Despite these important applicathat a felon would serve just long enough (sometimes as short as 36
tions of guidelines data, and the
days) to be processed in and out of prison and then returned to the
research mandates of most state commissions, there is still not enough pubcommunity on parole. Under the guidelines, a five-year sentence
lished data and analysis, particularly
means just that, with a minimal reduction for "good time." My own
evaluations by independent researchopinion is that, so long as judges have the discretion to impose a
ers. In some cases, this is because the
departure sentence upward or downward based on substantial and
guidelines are too new to have genercompelling aggravating or mitigating factors, judges retain an imated significant sentencing data. In
uniof
a
advantages
The
function.
portant discretionary sentencing
older systems, complete data may not
be collected due to inadequate comform system that takes prison space availability into consideration
mission budgets. When data is colimguidelines
the
outweighs the restriction on judicial discretion
lected, it is not always known, or made
pose.
fully available, to outside researchers.
Oregon is now faced with a likely need to modify its felony
Finally, such data, even when available,
guidelines in light of a ballot measure approved last fall that reis usually not collected and stored in a
sufficiently consistent form to permit
quires substantially longer sentences for certain types of crimes as
meaningful comparisons between
well as treatment of certain juvenile offenders as adults. The
guidelines states.
greatest challenge is in maintaining the integrity of the lowerNevertheless, much more is now
level categories of the guidelines (frequently those imposed
known in the guidelines states about
upon drug users and dealers, car thieves, and certain categories
sentencing practices and systemic imof burglars) while providing for substantially longer sentences for
pacts than was known in those states
the most serious offenders. The Oregon legislature in its upcomprior to guidelines (or is known today
in non-guidelines states). State guideing session will be considering a number of proposals. One is to
lines reforms have clearly succeeded
reserve prison space for offenders sentenced to one year or
in their goal of encouraging more inmore. Local jails and other community sanctions would be used
formed and rational sentencing policy
for all felons sentenced to one year or less as well as all
decisions. Published evaluations also
misdemeanants.
suggest that state guidelines have generally succeeded in achieving their
in
Court
Circuit
Oregon,
County,
Multnomah
on
the
a
judge
ELLEN F. ROSENBLUM is
Portland.
goals of reducing sentencing disparity,
lessening the impact of short-term pothe nature and extent of listed factors prior indeterminate sentencing re- litical pressures on sentencing policy,
to
that permit (or do not permit) depar- gimes, with little if any appellate re- and linking sentencing severity
2
resources.1
correctional
available
ture. Criminal history scoring is par- view, case-level issues were rarely adticularly diverse. These variations re- dressed in judicial opinions or
Future sentencing reform
flect differences in sentencing goals academic scholarship.
Case monitoring, research, and The need for balance in sentencing
and traditions, as well as the relatively
primitive state of case-level sentencing evaluation. Most state guidelines com- policy. The most important fact about
jurisprudence in this country. Under missions have been given a broad man- state guidelines is that they have surdate to collect and analyze sentencing vived and spread. Unlike the widely
data, not only to facilitate develop- criticized federal version, state guide12. Frase, supra n. 6; Tonry, supra n. 2.

Oregon's sentencing
guidelines

Januay-Februay1995
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lines reforms have attracted relatively
little sustained criticism, and guidelines continue to be adopted by other
states.
State guidelines are more popular
because they are, in many ways, more
balanced than their federal counterpart. Sentencing issues are inherently
very controversial, and sentencing
goals and limitations often conflict
with each other. The best that can be
hoped for is to achieve a reasonably
balanced and stable compromise on
key policy issues. Such issues include
(1) the relative weight given to different purposes of punishment and to offense versus offender characteristics;
(2) the proper balance between
uniformity and case-level flexibility;
(3) the degree of sanction severity (in
particular, the frequency and duration
of prison terms); and (4) the allocation of sentencing power among the
principal actors involved-the legislature, the sentencing commission, prosecutors, defense attorneys, correctional officials, trial judges, and
appellate courts.
In each of these four areas, state
guidelines generally appear to be
more balanced than the federal version. Offender characteristics receive
more weight in most state systems, departures are more common, sentencing is less severe, and sentencing
power, at both the policy-making and
individual case level, is shared more
broadly.
What factors might explain the better balance, and thus broader support,
of state guidelines? A larger, more representative sentencing commission
probably helps by ensuring that all
policy and practical perspectives are
considered. The legislative role may
also be important: Legislators must
support the sentencing commission's
independence (and budget) and
avoid micro-managing sentencing
policy, but they must still exercise
enough oversight to prevent the commission from being captured by any
narrow interest or perspective. Finally,
commitment to the goal of reducing
prison overcrowding through sentencing mechanisms helps commissioners
and politicians resist short-term political pressures to escalate penalties beyond what the public is willing to pay

for. This goal has received much
greater priority in the states than it has
at the federal level. This may be partly
due to the fact that correctional expenses constitute a much greater proportion of state budgets. At the federal
level, spiraling prison costs are still
relatively "small change" and do not
seriously interfere with other important funding priorities.
Prosecutorial discretion. No sentencing reform, state or federal, has
yet resolved the problem of prosecutorial discretion. Since prosecutors have
traditionally exercised nearly total
control over the number and severity
of charges filed and retained to conviction, the conviction-offense approach
universally adopted in state guidelines
risks giving prosecutors too much
power to dictate sentences that are either too severe or too lenient. However, even the limited scheme of "real
offense" enhancements permitted under the federal guidelines seems too
lawless and does not prevent prosecutors from controlling which "real offense" facts are known to the court.
Subject to further research, two tentative conclusions based on state
guidelines experiences can be
reached. First, the absence of any serious attempt to regulate prosecutorial
decisions reflects the extraordinary
difficulty of judicially enforcing such
controls in an adversary system. It is
especially difficult to enforce effective
lower (minimum severity) limits on
prosecutorial decisions, since most
cases of leniency have been negotiated
and will not be appealed by either side.
Internal controls (by supervising prosecutors) have more promise, 3 but
statewide rules are problematic since
local authorities need to tailor their
law enforcement resources to particular crime problems.
Second, the absence of widespread
complaints about prosecutorial dominance in state guidelines systems may
indicate that closer regulation is not
needed. Specifically, in a properly balanced guidelines system-one with
reasonable sentence severity levels, few
mandatory minimum terms, and substantial discretion to depart-prosecutorial decisions will rarely produce sentences judges strongly disapprove but
are powerless to prevent. In the fed-
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eral system, judges often complain
about the unreasonably harsh sentences they are forced to impose. Such
sentences result from the frequent application of rigid and excessive mandatory minimum prison terms (especially in drug cases), the strict
limitations on judicial departure powers, and the frequent use of "relevant
conduct" enhancements beyond the
conviction offense.
"Front-end" resource matching.
Governments, like individuals, must
live within their means. This simple
precept is particularly important in
sentencing. Politicians and the public
are always willing to increase penalties,
but rarely agree to lower them. They
are even more reluctant to raise taxes
to pay for higher penalties. The all-toocommon results are serious prison
overcrowding, court intervention, and
resort to increasingly desperate prison
releasing measures, such as accelerated parole and furloughs.
However, such "back-door" solutions only make problems worse, because they increase the disparity between the prison terms imposed by
courts and the lengths of time inmates
actually serve. At some point, this approach breaks down. Average time
served becomes so small, compared to
sentences imposed, 14 that both the
public and offenders lose respect for
the sentencing process. Offenders feel
they can beat the system, and politicians and the public, out of frustration, push for even harsher sanctions,
making matters worse.
Sentencing guidelines implemented
by a permanent sentencing commission can help break this vicious circle.
Because guidelines sentences are
more uniform, they permit more accurate predictions of the impact of current and proposed penalties on future
inmate populations. A permanent
commission, if adequately funded, can
develop the expertise needed to maxi13. See Frase, The Decision to File Federal Criminal
Charges: A Quantitative Study of ProsecutorialDiscretion, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 246-330 (1980) (review of
screening decisions by higher-level attorneys produced appropriate and consistent office prosecution policies in a large, urban federal district).
14. See essays in 6 FED. SENTENCING REP., supra n. 2,
at 129, 138 (prior to guidelines in North Carolina,
felons were serving an average of 18 percent of the
maximum term imposed. In Texas, the average
proportion of time served was 13 percent).

mize the accuracy of these predictions.
Accurate resource-need predictions
then allow the legislature to appropriate the funds needed to expand capacity in time to meet the demand, to
reduce the demand through mechanisms such as lowering prison commitment rates or durations for certain
offenders, or to pursue some combination of these approaches. Most important, if politicians, the media, and the
public can be told in specific terms
what various penalty increases will
cost, proponents of "get tough" measures can be forced to take responsibility for the eventual costs
and consequences of their
proposals in terms of increased taxes, program
cuts, or early release of

available resources. Accurate predictions are only possible if sentencing
achieves a certain minimum degree of
uniformity. Exactly what that degree is
remains an important area for further
research. Such research would compare guidelines states with and without
various features such as broad versus
narrower guidelines ranges, different
degrees of appellate review, and presence or absence of parole release discretion.
Intermediate sanctions. One of the
risks of reforms aimed at reducing sentencing disparity is that they tend to

be reached on specific exchange rates
for fundamentally different sanction
types, such as jail, home detention,
fines, and community service? How
should violations of release conditions
be sanctioned to ensure consistency,
maximize compliance, and minimize
resort to custodial measures?
A successful approach

Sentencing guidelines developed by
independent commissions have represented the dominant approach to sentencing reform in the states since the
late 1970s, and more and more states
are adopting them. A wide
variety of approaches has
been followed, and much
has been learned. Newer

The success of guidelines at the

systems, benefitting from

the experience of earlier
'ate level stands in marked
reforms, tend to be more
1sophisticated.
Older sys"ontrastto the continuing
tems continue to evolve,
ntroversysurroundingti e
correcting their mistakes,
incorporating new refinefederal guidelines.
ments, and responding to

other offenders.
S
Linking sentencing policy to resources allows the
public and officials to take
Cc
a comprehensive view of
sentencing issues, to set
priorities in the use of limited prison space, and to
explore forms of punishment less costly than incarceration. Legislators are thus better perpetuate, and may even encourage,
able to resist knee-jerk, lock-em-up re- heavy reliance on custodial sentencing
sponses to short-term public hysteria options. But sentencing guidelines, if
over particular crimes. Such responses linked to available resources, can also
produce a progression of steadily esca- strongly encourage states to make inlating penalties. All crime is terrible, creased use of intermediate sanctions.
but limited resources (and competing "Front-end" recognition of prison and
social needs) require hard choices. jail limitations forces policy makers to
Which crimes are relatively more seri- consider alternative forms of punishous? Which offenders require secure ment that are cheaper, and more rapcustody? What non-custodial sanctions idly expanded, than custodial facilities.
are available to punish less serious of- Sentencing commissions can greatly
fenders, facilitate their rehabilitation, increase the use and fairness of such
and promote victim and community sanctions by incorporating them into
restitution?
the scheme of presumptive sentences
"Front-end" resource matching is and by developing "exchange rates"
thus an essential component of future that permit choices among a wide varistate and federal sentencing reforms. ety of sanctions deemed to have
To make such a system work, some gov- roughly equivalent punitive impact. 5
The guidelines states have done a lot
ernmental body independent of the
legislature must have the legal author- more with this than the federal comity, budget, and will to collect detailed mission, but important issues of policy
sentencing data, make resource-need and practice remain. How closely can
predictions, and recommend guide- intermediate sanctions be regulated
line sentences that will not exceed without creating the excessive complexity that afflicts the federal guide15. See generally Morris and Tonry, BETWEEN
lines? Should minimum as well as maxiPRISON AND PROBATION: INTERMEDIATE PUNISHMENTS IN
mum severity limits be defined, and
A RATIONAL SENTENCING SYSTEM 37-81 (1990).
16. Tonry, supran. 2, at 184-185.
can they be enforced? Can consensus
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changing conditions and
priorities. 16
The experience of the
states suggests that sentencing guidelines can reduce disparity without
imposing excessive rigidity, can promote "truth in sentencing" by more
closely matching time imposed to
time served, can help states avoid
prison overcrowding by linking sentencing policy to available resources,
and can encourage wider use of intermediate sanctions. "Front-end"
resource management has become
one of the most important reasons
for states to adopt guidelines. Parole
and other "back door" release
mechanisms can deal with prison
overcrowding, but cannot achieve either "truth in sentencing" or the
most efficient use of limited correctional resources.
The success of guidelines at the state
level stands in marked contrast to the
continuing controversy surrounding
the federal guidelines. State guidelines appear to have proved more successful because they have achieved a
better balance on the key issues of resource matching, sanction severity and
type, allowable sentencing factors, and
the degree of case-level discretion. T1
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